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Document Details
Document Type
:
Article In Journal
Document Title
:
Costly hide and seek pays: unexpected consequences of deceit in a social dilemma
Costly hide and seek pays: unexpected consequences of deceit in a social dilemma
Subject
:
physics
Document Language
:
English
Abstract
:
Deliberate deceptiveness intended to gain an advantage is commonplace in human and animal societies. In a social dilemma, an individual may only pretend to be a cooperator to elicit cooperation from others, while in reality he is a defector. With this as motivation, we study a simple variant of the evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game entailing deceitful defectors and conditional cooperators that lifts the veil on the impact of such two-faced behavior. Defectors are able to hide their true intentions at a personal cost, while conditional cooperators are probabilistically successful at identifying defectors and act accordingly. By focusing on the evolutionary outcomes in structured populations, we observe a number of unexpected and counterintuitive phenomena. We show that deceitful behavior may fare better if it is costly, and that a higher success rate of identifying defectors does not necessarily favor cooperative behavior. These results are rooted in the spontaneous emergence of cycling dominance and spatial patterns that give rise to fascinating phase transitions, which in turn reveal the hidden complexity behind the evolution of deception.
ISSN
:
1367-2630
Journal Name
:
NEW JOURNAL OF PHYSICS
Volume
:
162
Issue Number
:
11
Publishing Year
:
1435 AH
2012 AD
Article Type
:
Article
Added Date
:
Thursday, July 27, 2017
Researchers
Researcher Name (Arabic)
Researcher Name (English)
Researcher Type
Dr Grade
Email
Attila (Szolnok
(Szolnok, Attila
Investigator
Doctorate
szolnoki.attila@ttk.mta.hu
Matjaz Perc
Perc, Matjaz
Researcher
Doctorate
Files
File Name
Type
Description
42307.pdf
pdf
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